On April 24, Project Eleven recognized Giancarlo Lelli with its Q-Day Prize for successfully deriving a 15-bit elliptic curve private key from its public counterpart using publicly available quantum hardware.

This marks the largest public exhibition of a quantum attack method that could eventually pose risks to Bitcoin, Ethereum, and any other systems relying on elliptic curve cryptography. Lelli was awarded one Bitcoin for his accomplishment.

It’s noteworthy that a researcher obtained Bitcoin by exploiting a simplified version of the mathematics that secures it.

The 15-bit key offers significantly less security than Bitcoin’s 256-bit elliptic curve, and currently, no publicly known quantum computer is capable of compromising actual Bitcoin wallets.

This development emerges at a time of increasing urgency, as Google recently revised its resource estimates for ECDLP-256, imposing a migration deadline of 2029 within the same month.

Understanding Lelli’s Method

Lelli employed a variation of Shor’s algorithm, a quantum computational technique aimed at solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which underpins Bitcoin’s signature framework, to extract a private key from a public key within a search domain of 32,767.

The Q-Day Prize competition challenged participants to break the largest possible ECC key using a quantum computer, without relying on classical techniques or hybrid methods.

Lelli’s achievement of a 15-bit key was the farthest any contestant reached by the deadline, with Project Eleven noting it represented a 512-fold increase over Steve Tippeconnic’s 6-bit demonstration from September 2025.

The quantum computer utilized for this task was equipped with approximately 70 qubits, according to reports from Decrypt, with evaluation conducted by an independent panel that included experts from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and qBraid, as indicated by Project Eleven.

This outcome can be viewed as a tiny lock being picked using methods that could one day challenge the integrity of secure vaults. For now, the locksmiths have advanced, but the vault remains intact.

Claim Supporting Evidence Importance
A quantum computer breached a 15-bit ECC key According to Project Eleven, Giancarlo Lelli derived a 15-bit elliptic curve private key from a public key using publicly available quantum technology This transforms the quantum threat from a theoretical concern to a concrete demonstration
Bitcoin itself was not compromised The text specifies that no known quantum computer can currently break real Bitcoin wallets This maintains the integrity of the article and avoids exaggerating the significance of the finding
The demonstration used a method relevant to Bitcoin Lelli employed a version of Shor’s algorithm targeting the elliptic curve discrete logarithm challenge, foundational to Bitcoin’s signature scheme This links the demonstration to actual cryptographic risks without suggesting equivalence
The demonstration adhered to strict guidelines The Q-Day Prize necessitated contestants to break the largest ECC key using quantum computing without shortcuts This emphasizes the significance of the finding as a quantum benchmark
The outcome surpassed previous public ECC demonstrations Project Eleven characterized the 15-bit achievement as a 512-fold increase over Steve Tippeconnic’s 6-bit result from September 2025 This underscores progress in public demonstrations
The disparity to Bitcoin’s 256-bit security is vast It is noted that a 15-bit key does not approach Bitcoin’s 256-bit elliptic curve security This key caveat assists readers in understanding the story accurately
The hardware involved was still minimal by actual attack standards The quantum computer in question reportedly had around 70 qubits This indicates that the achievement is significant as a milestone but not proof of imminent full-scale attacks
The overall narrative is one of caution, not alarm Public demonstrations are getting progressively larger, resource estimates are declining, and migration deadlines are becoming clearer The threat remains in the future, but the timeframe is increasingly harder to ignore

This demonstration carries more weight than it would have six months ago, in part due to Google’s recent actions.

On March 31, Google released updated ECDLP-256 resource estimates for circuits that require fewer than 1,200 logical qubits and 90 million Toffoli gates, or fewer than 1,450 logical qubits and 70 million Toffoli gates.

These circuits were estimated to be executable on a superconducting quantum computer relevant to cryptography with under 500,000 physical qubits, representing nearly a 20-fold decrease from previous calculations.

On March 25, Google announced a 2029 target for its transition to post-quantum cryptography, explicitly linking this deadline with advancements in hardware, error correction, and resource assessments.

Cloudflare adopted the same 2029 target on April 7, referencing both Google’s study and a Caltech/Oratomic preprint that underscores the urgency for acceleration.

The preprint argued that neutral-atom architectures could implement Shor’s algorithm at cryptographically relevant scales with as few as 10,000 reconfigurable atomic qubits.

In a commentary on April 9, QuTech noted that even at 10,000 qubits, the architecture would still need nearly three years to decipher a single ECC-256 key, while an optimally efficient setup with 26,000 qubits could shorten the computation time to about 10 days.

Both projections rely on machines that currently do not exist, and the Caltech/Oratomic analysis remains an unverified preprint.

The key takeaway from these numbers is that some theoretical architectures now propose long-term hardware requirements significantly lower than what researchers believed just a year ago.

The timeline for public demonstrations is tightening, resource estimates are diminishing, and migration schedules are taking on real deadlines.